

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-07 NRC-05 OES-07 FEAE-00
DODE-00 ERDA-05 SS-15 SP-02 PM-04 H-01 PA-01
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C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 5834

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, UR, US
SUBJECT: CCD/ US-SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS, FOURTH ROUND:
FIFTH SESSION

1. SUMMARY: DURING FIFTH SESSION OF BILATERAL CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS, US RESPONDED TO QUESTIONS PUT BY
SOVIET EXPERT AT PREVIOUS SESSION. IN ADDITION, SOVIET
DEL HAD MADE BRIEF STATEMENT ON VERIFICATION FOLLOWED BY
SEVERAL QUESTIONS FROM SOVIET EXPERTS. CURRENT ROUND
EXPECTED TO END MONDAY JULY 18. END SUMMARY

2. FIFTH SESSION OF FOURTH ROUND OF US-SOVIET CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS WE HELD THURSDAY FATERNOON, JUL 14.

3. RESPONDING TO SOVIET QUESTIONS FROM PREVIOUS ROUND,
US EXPERT (MIKULAK) STATED THAT US SIDE BELIEVED THAT IT
WOULD BE MORE PRACTICAL TO DEAL WITH PRECURSORS ON THE
BASIS OF A GENERAL DEFINITION, RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO
DRAW UP A COMPREHENSIVE LIST. GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE
US CONSIDERED THE TERM "PRECURSOR" TO MEAN ANY CHEMICAL
WHICH CAN BE USED IN PRODUCING A CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT.
A MORE PRECISE DEFINITION COULD BE DEVELOPED DURING THE
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DARFTING OF THE CONVENTION. ANY UNDERTAINTY WHICH MIGHT
ARISE AS TO WHETHER A SPECIFIC CHEMICAL IS A SINGLE-PURPOSE
PRECURSOR COULD BE DEALT WITH BY THE CONSULATIVE COMMITTEE.

4. MIKULAK ANSWERED SOVIET QUESTION ON COVERAGE OF
INCAPACITANTS BY EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT ALL INCAPACITANTS
SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ON THE BASIS OF THE GENERAL PURPOSE

CRITERION. IN RESPONSE TO A SOVIET SUGGESTION THAT A THRESHOLD BASED ON INCAPACITATING ACTIVITY WAS A POSSIBILITY, HE NOTED THAT A RECENT US WORKING PAPER AT THE CCD EXPRESSED US JUDGEMENT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE PRACTICAL TO ADOPT SUCH THRESHOLDS.

5. AT PREVIOUS SESSION SOVIET EXPERT HAD ALSO WONDERED WHETHER ITTITATNS SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE CONVENTION, FOR EXAMPLE, ADAMSITE ("WHICH MAY HAVE A LETHAL EFFECT"). MIKULAK RESPONSE WAS THAT RIOT CONTROL AGENTS SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED, BUT THAT US DOES NOT CURRENTLY CONSIDER ADAMSITE TO BE IN THAT CATEGORY.

6. FINAL SOVIET QUESTION DEALT WITH NEED FOR TWO TOXICITY THRESHOLDS PROPOSED BY US, SINCE IN SOVIET VIEW ONLY ONE WAS NECESSARY. IN REPLY MIKULAK STATED THAT US PROPOSAL FOR TWO TOXICITY THRESHOLDS IS DESIGNED TO PERMIT THE LEVEL OF CONTROLS TO BE RELATED TO THE TOXICITY OF THE CHEMICALS INVOLVED. THUS, THE STRICTEST CONTROLS WOULD BE APPLIED TO THE SUPER-TOXIC CATEGORY AND LESSER CONTROLS TO THE GROUP OF INTERMEDIATE TOXICITY.

7. SOVIET DEL HEAD (LIKHACHEV) MADE STANDARD STATEMENT ON VERIFICATION, EXPRESSING VIEW THAT VERIFICATION SYSTEM SHOULD BE BASED ON NATIONAL CONTROL (I.E. "SELF-POLICING"). THIS COULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY: (A) INFORMATION EXCHANGE
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AMONG PARTIES ON QUESTIONS RELATED TO COMPLIANCE, (B) COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION AMONG STATES IN SITUATION WHERE DOUBT ABOUT COMPLIANCE EXISTS, AND (C) EXAMINATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF COMPLAINTS OF TREATY VIOLATION. LIKHACHEV NOTED THAT US LAID STRESS ON INTERNATIONAL FORMS OF CONTROL AND INSPECTION, BUT GAVE LITTLE ATTENTION TO NATIONAL CONTROL. HE EMPHASIZED SOVIET VIEW THAT THE VERY FACT OF A STATE'S PARTICIPATION IN A CONVENTION IS SUFFICIENT GUARANTEE THAT THE STATE WILL ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION IN AREAS UNDER ITS JURISDICTION OR CONTROL. FINALLY, HE STATED, AS "BASIC PRINCIPLES", THAT THE SYSTEM OF CONTROL SHOULD NOT VIOLATE THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF STATES OR LEAD TO DISCLOSURE OF MILITARY OR COMMERCIAL SECRETS.

8. US DEL HEAD (FISHER) GAVE PRELIMINARY RESPONSE, NOTING THAT THE US DOES NOT WISH TO MONITOR THE ENTIRE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT NATIONAL CONTROL COULD BE EXPECTED TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE. WHAT IS NEEDED IS SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL TO CHECK NATIONAL CONTROL AS BOTH MUST HAVE THE ABILITY TO SATISFY OURSELVES THAT THE AGREEMENT IS BEING FOLLOWED. THEREFORE, US HAS

PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

9. SOVIET EXPERT (DAMAEV) REITERATED SOVIET VIEW THAT CURRENT REMOTE MONITORING CAPABILITIES ARE SUFFICIENT FOR VERIFICATION OF BANS ON PRODUCTION AND TESTING AND ASKED FOR US VIEWS ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE TWO SOVIET PAPERS PRESENTED TO THE US DURING SECOND ROUND OF BILATERALS. ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ON PERMITTED USES OF SUPER-TOXIC AGENTS AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WERE PUT BY SOVIET MILITARY EXPERT (CHUGOOV).

10. AT NEXT SESSION, SCHEDULED FOR MONDAY MORNING, JULY 18, US SIDE WILL REPLY TO SOVIET QUESTIONS. WE EXPECT THIS TO BE FINAL SESSION OF FOURTH ROUND.
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11. US DEL HEAD SUGGESTED TO SOVIET SIDE THAT NEXT ROUND BEGIN IN MID-AUGUST, PRIOR TO INFORMAL CCD MEETINGS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS SCHEDULED FOR WEEK OF AUGUST 22-26. SOVIET DEL HEAD SAID HE PERSONALLY AGREED WITH SUGGESTION AND WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS. VANDEN HEUVEL

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